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1. Globalization and Intelligence  
In 1991, a group of Palestinian refugees, mostly former members of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation, arrived in Norway seeking political asylum. They were 
interviewed by the Overvakingspolitiet, Norway's security police. The officers who 
interviewed them over an extended period spoke excellent Arabic and elicited a quantity 
of information, which the Palestinians believed would contribute to the consideration of 
their refugee status. Eventually, the suspicions of the refugees were aroused when they 
discovered that some of these 'Norwegians' could not speak Norwegian. In the event they 
proved to be officers of Mossad who were engaged in co-operation with their Nordic 
colleagues. A public furore ensued. The Norwegian parliament produced a critical report 
and called for stricter guidelines on intelligence co-operation. Although Svein Urdal, the 
chief of the security police, was forced to resign, together with the head of Norway's anti-
terrorist unit, the oversight committee failed in its efforts to elicit much information about 
the relationship with Mossad. Moreover, their efforts to develop new procedures intended 
to allow more insight into international intelligence co-operation did not progress very 
far.1
 International intelligence co-operation - or 'liaison' - has long been identified as an 
area that is opaque to oversight and accountability bodies, indeed it also constitutes a 
notoriously difficult area for academics, journalists and other researchers. This is partly 
because of the extreme secrecy that intelligence agencies attach to 'liaison' . Not only do 
they wish to avoid damaging these relationships but also they are not always keen to 
inform their political masters of their degree of dependency on friends for certain streams 
of intelligence. Moreover, intelligence co-operation is a diffuse activity and so 
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intrinsically hard to monitor. Although some larger intelligence agencies boast an office 
of liaisons, in reality it spread across every aspect of the intelligence process.2
 For more than a decade the 'black hole' of international intelligence co-operation 
has been expanding rapidly. Stephen Lander, the former Director General of MI5, has 
observed that the exponential increase in international intelligence co-operation 
constitutes the most significant change within the world of intelligence over the last 
decade.3 Most obviously, since 2001, the 'Global War on Terror' has greatly accelerated 
the scope and scale of international co-operation. It has also prompted more aggressive 
operations by clandestine agencies - including rendition - which some legislatures have 
been keen to investigate.  However, this article argues that activities such as rendition are 
merely the most visible symptom of a more fundamental change in the style intelligence 
activity that has been underway since the mid-1990s. Most of the targets that intelligence 
agencies have been asked to address since the end of the Cold War have an increasingly 
globalized dimension - and in response - intelligence and security agencies are being 
forced to globalize their activities. Agencies, together with their operations and their 
targets are moving apace down the transnational trail. The resulting changes include the 
development of a global world of domestic security liaison and accelerating privatisation 
of some key functions. Unsurprisingly, accountability and oversight have been left 
behind. 
 'Globalization' is a word that social scientists use ad nauseam, but rarely pause to 
define. Jan Arte Sholte, in his widely referenced text, has tended to emphasise the spatial 
(or spatio-temporal) aspects of this phenomenon. This perspective is primarily about 
social and political geography, distinguished by the development of 'supraterritorial 
spaces', which exist awkwardly alongside conventional sovereign territoriality.4  This 
particular notion of globalization speaks directly to current intelligence targets, agencies 
and their operations. Since the end of the Cold War, states have been increasingly 
confronted by security problems that emanate from non-state actors. States have made 
things worse by deliberately opening up their borders to free flows of money, expertise, 
communications and ideas in order to benefit from exponential increases in volumes of 
trade. Terrorists, warlords and criminals have been quick to capitalise on this fluidity. 
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Many of these adversaries have ridden the wave of globalization, employing dispersed 
networks to hide their activities and achieving a somewhat mercurial existence.5  
 The elusive nature of these opponents has prompted states to develop counter-
measures that are increasingly intelligence-led. We are not only seeing a quantitative 
increase in co-operation between the intelligence services of different states, but also 
qualitative changes. We are seeing improbable intelligence partners, rather than the 
familiar combination of Cold War intelligence collaborators. While the majority of 
meaningful intelligence exchange remains bilateral, multilateral co-operation in areas 
such as training and field operations is also growing. Moreover, we are witnessing a 
remarkable growth in the inter-connections between domestic police and security 
services, eroding the distinction between what constitutes domestic and foreign. Finally, 
private security companies and corporate providers of national infrastructure - sometimes 
themselves multinationals - are playing a larger part in intelligence operations. These 
latter developments resonate strongly with the spatial notions of globalization.6
 We can usefully deploy the term globalization several other senses. Underlined by 
the collapse of Iron Curtain, globalization has been closely associated with the 
cosmopolitan idea of global citizenship, implying a common ownership of liberal and 
humane values - and of course - human rights.  Cosmopolitans like David Held have 
argued that globalization requires the extension of liberal democratic institutions to the 
transnational level. Recognising that states are ill-equipped to deal with some of today's 
global maladies, they argue for more supranational authority, either at the regional or 
global level, and for the democratisation of existing forms of governance. These sorts of 
bodies, typically within the European Union, are now taking a stronger interest in 
intelligence oversight. Arguably they have little choice given the growing profile of 
intelligence as a mode of policing the underside of globalization. However, while much-
beloved of academics, real examples of effective and democratic global governance are 
few and far between.7  
 We may only have weak global governance, but we have witnessed the 
development of strong global civil society. Here, globalization manifests itself in the 
form of citizen groups and transnational bodies that campaign on thematic issues, such as 
human rights and the environment. The number of transnational NGOs broadly doubled 
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in the 1990s. Of course, transnational civil society contains both civil and uncivil 
elements. The facilitating aspects of globalization - not least the internet - that make new 
forms of oppositional politics possible are often the same aspects that have encouraged 
new forms of insecurity from transnational threats.8 Some would argue that this informal 
network of counter-surveillance by activists and pressure groups, although unable to call 
intelligence agencies directly to account, has nevertheless proved to be a moderately 
effective means of intelligence oversight. Self-evidently, it is less troubled by state 
boundaries than national committees and commissions of inquiry.9
 This article argues that these three facets of globalization all bear heavily on 
intelligence oversight and accountability. More precisely, if we accept that intelligence 
activities are now globalizing, there is an obvious mismatch between the emerging new 
style of operational activity and the traditional patterns of accountability which look 
increasingly parochial. Intelligence co-operation or 'liaison' has always presented a 
challenge for bodies charged with accountability and oversight. However this article 
contends that the scope and scale of co-operation has resulted in a qualitative change that 
now renders traditional forms of accountability - rooted in the sovereign nation-state - 
increasingly outmoded and incomplete. 
 These arguments are developed here by considering the interplay between 
intelligence liaison, globalization and accountability since 1989. It first examines the 
inter-play between intelligence and accelerating globalization in the 1990s. It then moves 
on to review the recent efforts of national accountability mechanisms, both standing and 
ad hoc, in this realm. Thereafter, it looks at more unusual examples of supranational 
endeavours at both the regional and then international levels. It argues that some of these 
latter supranational exercises have been more successful than we might imagine. This is 
especially true where legal rather than political avenues have been exploited. It closes 
with some modest recommendations for future development of mechanisms for 
accountability and oversight in a globalized context.  
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2. Intelligence and the promise of 'perpetual peace' 
Not all the current troubles of intelligence relate to events since 9/11. To understand the 
multiple impact of globalization upon intelligence and accountability we need to consider 
several trends that were emerging in the previous decade. In the early 1990s, few 
anticipated the significant security challenges that now confront us. Instead, Francis 
Fukuyama famously promised us 'the end of history'. This was a short-hand expression 
intended to denote the anticipation of a quiescent period in international relations 
characterised by peaceful competition between parliamentary democracies that had 
engaged with a liberalised world economy.10 Fukuyama was not alone. Singing a descant 
were the confident assertions of the democratic peace theorists (DPT) that liberal 
democracies do not fight each other. The DPT literature is too vast and complex to be 
summarised here.11 For a brief period, these assertions seemed entirely plausible, since 
the early 1990s contained some undeniable advances. Autocracies had crumbled, not only 
in Eastern Europe, but also in South America and Africa. Prolonged and intractable 
conflicts, such as Northern Ireland, seemed to be drawing to a close.12
 The end of the Cold War in 1989 had roundly surprised the intelligence services. 
Thereafter, the subsequent talk of 'perpetual peace' represented a second and more 
fundamental shock, particularly for American intelligence bureaucracies, which operated 
on an industrial scale. What would intelligence and security agencies do in this new 
period of global calm and prosperity? After a brief period of moral panic, the agencies 
attempted to re-invent themselves for an era of economic competition between 
democratic states. During his confirmation hearings in February 1993, the new DCI, 
James Woolsey, told Congress that economic espionage was 'the hottest current topic in 
intelligence policy'.13 However, they failed to convince the politicians and Western 
intelligence budgets were cut by a quarter. The Treasury men in Whitehall also saw the 
intelligence services as soft targets. By 1994 there no longer seemed to be a rationale for 
spending millions for the privilege of GCHQ listening in on Russian tank commanders in 
Chechnya and similar cuts followed in the UK.14   
 Other important changes were underway. As we have seen, the end of the Cold 
War was closely associated with the optimistic themes of openness, liberalisation and 
democratisation. In Europe, this was reflected in a rush to place intelligence services on 
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the statute book. Admittedly, this was driven as much by a specific ruling by the 
European Court of Human Rights as the end of the Cold War. However, it was also in the 
spirit of the age. An extraordinary flurry of legislation between 1989 and 1995 saw most 
European agencies embrace legal frameworks, often incorporating the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Some countries, imbued with enthusiasm for the 
new regulatory state, even incorporated references to ECHR into their detailed guidelines 
on surveillance. Across Europe, intelligence and security services had discovered the law 
and now found it operationally beneficial. Operations no longer depended on secrecy, but 
on legality. This enthusiasm for regulation was soon exported to the newly reconstructed 
intelligence services of central and eastern Europe by evangelisers from the London and 
the Hague through the Middle European Conference, a mechanism for intelligence 
reform in the East.   
 Parallel trends could be observed in Washington. Here too, there was greater 
emphasis on legality and regulation. High-risk human operations were no longer popular 
and, following several high-profile human rights cases in locations such as Guatemala, 
new internal regulations were put in place curtailing the CIA's use of 'dirty assets'. In 
1995, it was revealed that a CIA paid informant had been involved in the deaths of an 
American hotelier and the Guatemalan husband of an American Harvard-trained lawyer. 
After an inquiry by the CIA Inspector General, Fred Hitz, CIA headquarters now insisted 
on a complete a review before agents with criminal or human-rights problems could be 
recruited in the field. Although the new procedures were well-meaning, many valued 
agents were let go. Future agents were reviewed by risk-adverse legal staff in 
Washington. The sheer bureaucratic effort involved in acquiring agents that worked in 
dirty places ensured that few were recruited. In any case, in a new era of perpetual peace, 
edgy operations simply did not seem to be justifiable and calculated risk-taking was 
replaced by risk aversion.15
 Arguably, this amounted to a further intelligence failure. Having failed to spot the 
end of the Cold War, the intelligence services also failed to assess the nature of the 
emerging 'hot peace' characterised by violent transnational groups and problematic sub-
state actors. Instead, they downsized their capacity and focused on economic counter-
intelligence. They set about dismantling many of the networks that would have been 
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valuable in addressing the underside of globalization. Instead, by 1999 it was abundantly 
clear that main threat would instead be insurgents, warlords, militias, 'new terrorists' and 
organized crime, all riding to some extent on the coat tails of globalization. One of the 
linking themes amongst this miasma of 'new threats' was that many of them depended 
upon a degree of subterfuge. Developed states had always found asymmetrical warfare 
difficult and these sorts of conflicts were now erupting in many corners of the world. Few 
had envisaged the high incidence of these sorts of conflicts and no country was properly 
prepared for them.16
 It would be unfair to suggest that globalization was entirely ignored by 
intelligence in the 1990s. Re-organisation reflected a growing tendency to draw lessons 
from private corporations, especially knowledge-intensive organisations. SIS set up a 
global issues section, initially small, but rapidly expanding by the late 1990s.17 It 
changed its modus operandi, placing less emphasis on country stations and more 
emphasis on flexible teams despatched from London. During the mid-1990s, under David 
Omand and then Kevin Tebbit, GCHQ began a major re-organisation, taking some 
interest in  companies like Shell and Microsoft. The essence was to move away from a 
rigid Cold War architecture characterised by silos and to achieve a new flexibility. The 
emphasis was on moving away from 'need to know' towards 'need to share'. This included 
an accelerated effort to adopt new technologies to try and keep abreast of the revolution 
in telecommunications, entitled 'Signals Intelligence New Systems' or SINEWS. GCHQ's 
American equivalent struggled woefully to address the global communications 
revolution, which brought exponential increases in volumes of communications.18  Tony 
Blair's New Labour government arrived in 1997, bringing with it a foreign policy that 
was interventionist in style, requiring more intelligence support. Blair was also keen to 
see the intelligence services in the frontline of the war against organised crime and held a 
Downing Street summit on the subject in 1999.  
 Accordingly, while 9/11 is often represented as tabula rasa for intelligence, the 
theme of globalization illuminates some important continuities with the previous decade. 
The growth of Al Qaeda in the 1990s was interwoven with globalization, indeed this was 
what marked it out from other jihadist organizations. As Gerges has explained, While 
many national jihadists were focused on overthrowing their local government - the so-
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called 'Near Enemy' - Al Qaeda was seeking to ally groups around the world against the 
'Far Enemy' - the United States.19 In other words, although Al Qaeda postured as an 
enemy of modernity, paradoxically it was riding the wave of globalisation, exemplified 
by its extensive use of the internet. John Gray has eloquently summarised Al Qaeda's 
disingenuous relationship with globalization, suggesting that, in reality, it amounts to 'a 
symptom of the disease of which it is pretending to be the cure'.20  
 Gray's distinction between symptom and disease helps to illuminate the relatively 
superficial ways in which intelligence has addressed globalization. Intelligence chiefs 
have not been slow to respond to a range of 'symptoms' produced by globalization. 
Indeed, through the 1990s managers thrashed about seeking plausible new enemies and 
found plenty of them. However, their search for a single dominant theme revealed the 
persistence of continued Cold War thinking. Moreover, they had not identified 
globalisation itself as a fundamental source of disruption and instability. Accordingly, we 
can find few explicit references to the detrimental impact of globalization per se on 
national security in the 1990s. Belatedly, in February 2003, the US National Counter 
Terrorism Strategy observed: 
 
Ironically, the particular nature of the terrorist threat we face today springs in large 
part from some of our past successes …  terrorist networks have twisted the benefits 
and conveniences of our increasingly open, integrated, and modernised world to 
serve their destructive agenda … Its global activities are co-ordinated through the 
use of personal couriers and communication technologies emblematic of our era — 
cellular and satellite phones, encrypted e-mail, internet chat rooms, videotape, and 
CD-roms.21
 
In the same month, George Tenet warned Congress of key transnational issues that were 
complex, evolving, and that have far-reaching consequences. Tenet did not mince his 
words and stated that: 'Globalization - while a net plus for the global economy - is a 
profoundly disruptive force for governments to manage.' 22  
 The reluctance of intelligence agencies to think through the profound 
consequences of globalization for their activities has deleterious effects. Some of these 
are merely operational. Typically, it has degraded their effectiveness against terrorism. 
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Despite the claims to be pursuing a 'Global War on Terror', most American intelligence 
officials overlooked the important links between terrorism and globalisation. In the words 
of Audrey Cronin, the result has been that we are now 'behind the curve' on 
globalization.23 Indeed, despite much rhetoric about the 'new terrorism', there were in fact 
many similarities between 'old' and 'new' organisations since much of its newness came 
from the global context. Al Qaeda, like many other post-Cold War pathologies, drew its 
strength from the complexity of a networked world.24  
 Although intelligence agencies have failed to conceptualize the fundamental way 
in which globalization is changing the terrain, globalization has nevertheless been the 
main driver of change in the world of intelligence. New challenges have forced them to 
reverse the downsizing of the 1990s and to grow at a remarkable rate, including 
significant privatisation.25 Most importantly they have been forced to radically increase 
the range and depth of international partnership. Sharing, and especially multilateral 
sharing, of sensitive data is an anathema to intelligence agencies and so the extent to 
which their hesitations have been overcome is a testament to a change born of necessity. 
Moreover, as Martin Rudner and Adam Svendsen have argued, co-operation also 
includes the increasing standardisation of training and methodology, together with joint 
operations. Others have pointed to the sheer proliferation of alliance partnerships.  Most 
important are the increasing international connections between internal security services 
of many countries, a profound sign of deterritorialization. Even a small domestic service, 
such as the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET), has established relations with eighty 
services in fifty countries.26  The boundary between what is inside that state and what is 
outside - for years the key distinction between intelligence services and security services 
- is increasingly porous. 
 Intelligence and security services have often been represented as villains of the 
piece during the last ten years, but they might equally be perceived as victims, caught 
amid the unpredictable tides of globalization. They are now being asked to undertake 
much more invasive surveillance, together with a range of kinetic activities that includes 
disruption and enforcement. Rendition is an obvious example. Yet the enhanced 
expectations of ethical behaviour, policed by a vibrant global civil society, have not 
diminished. The manner in which recent operations against terrorism have gone global, 
 9
Global Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability 
but accountability mechanisms have not, is a further symptom of these contradictions. 
The paradoxes are perhaps more acute in the case of intelligence and security services 
because as institutions, they are peculiarly tied to notions of sovereignty. This can be 
illustrated by comparison with armed forces. States are often willing for their military 
units to be placed under the allied command, however this is much less common in the 
case of secret services. This raises interesting questions about Westphalian notions of 
security and the Just War tradition.27  
How important are these contradictions? On one level we might dismiss recent 
controversies associated with rendition, as part of a familiar cycle of revelation and 
recrimination that has characterised the history of covert action over several decades. 
History shows us that the more robust activities of the CIA are celebrated and then 
flagellated by equal turns. Long-suffering practitioners assert that this is nothing new. 
However, this article argues that the current changes and challenges may be more 
profound. The Westphalian basis of intelligence accountability is being eroded by the 
global nature of alliance operations. Meanwhile, we are seeing the gradual rise of 
additional types of accountability. Supranational bodies in Europe, and elsewhere, have 
begun to take an interest. Moreover, recognising that they have limited political purchase 
they have also used formal legal mechanisms, seeking to enforce treaties and 
conventions. In addition, we have also seen the rising importance of a messy coalition of 
investigative journalists, campaign groups and NGOs. This manifestation of global civil 
society has not only been important in applying political pressure, but has also begun to 
eclipse national bodies as the lead investigators. One of the many claims for globalization 
is that it is making it harder for states to keep secrets, despite their desire to re-assert the 
importance of state secrets privilege.28 Alongside a growing interest in intelligence 
amongst supranational bodies we may also be seeing an emerging culture of 'regulation 
by revelation'.29  
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3. National Mechanisms of Accountability 
How far have national accountability mechanisms faired in examining the new world of 
enhanced liaison? How effective have they been in addressing the globalization of 
intelligence practices? Although rarely remarked on, the institutions of accountability and 
oversight have their own patterns of co-operation, focused upon the bi-annual International 
Intelligence Review Agencies Conference. The first conference was held in Canberra in 
1997, focusing on the role of Inspectors General, and attracted no less than twenty-two 
delegates from six countries.30 The second was held in Ottawa in 1999 and the third was 
scheduled to be held in Washington in 2001, albeit this was cancelled in the wake of the 
events of 9/11. The UK hosted the third conference in 2002, while Washington became 
the venue of a fourth conference in 2004. In 2004, the hosts declared that the purpose of 
this bi-annual conference was for delegates 'to strengthen their relationships with one 
another, share their experiences in establishing oversight systems, and discuss more 
effective ways of conducting intelligence oversight and strengthening accountability'. 
Conference agendas have ranged over subjects that included operating policies and 
procedures, resource and recruitment challenges, together with the relationship of 
intelligence agencies with executive, judicial, and legislative oversight bodies and the 
media. The delegates have included not only members of scrutiny committees but also 
commissioners and inspectors general.31  
 In October 2006 the conference was held in Cape Town, a first for the African 
continent.32 Hosted jointly by the South African Joint Standing Committee on 
Intelligence and the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence, the theme was 
‘Balancing National Security and Constitutional Principles within a Democracy’. 
Delegates from Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, South Africa, the United Kingdom as well as the United States attended the 
gathering. Officials from Ghana, Namibia and Tanzania also participated as observers. A 
key theme was the African continent’s commitment to deepening democracy through 
intelligence oversight. The Minister of Intelligence Services, Ronnie Kasrils, gave the 
keynote address and chose to speak on the theme of  ‘National Security in a Globalised 
World: Challenges for Intelligence Oversight’. However, despite the promising theme 
and the unusually international complexion of the gathering, the problem of extending 
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oversight to liaison was not addressed. Meanwhile, the concept of global governance 
reared its head only in the form of savoury digressions into subjects such as trade 
inbalances.33
 Alongside this formal conference mechanism, there is also considerable bilateral 
'accountability tourism'. Typically, in 1999, the UK's Intelligence and Security Committee 
(UK ISC) visited the Romanian Parliamentary oversight committees and then travelled to 
Poland as the guests of the Parliamentary Special Services Committee. In Warsaw, they 
met the Minister Co-ordinator of the Polish Security Service, the National Security 
Adviser, a representative of the Office of State Protection and the Head of Military 
Intelligence. In May 2000 the UK ISC spent a week in the United States meeting both the 
House Permanent and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, together with the heads 
and representatives of the US intelligence agencies and the Presidential Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board.34 However, by all accounts these meetings have studiously 
ignored the subject of liaison, instead they focused on sharing best practice at a national 
level. This is hardly surprising, since their own requirement to maintain confidentiality 
make the prospect of the joint investigation of any subject intrinsically difficult.35  
 However, by 2001, numerous national committees and commissions on intelligence 
were being forced to grapple with matters that arose directly out of the accelerating pace of 
international intelligence co-operation. The events of 9/11, the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, together with the 'Global War on Terror', presented cross-cutting issues that could only 
be properly understood in the context of liaison. In the decade since 9/11, national 
mechanisms have not faired well in their attempts to introspect into multinational activities. 
Three examples of types of national inquiry that have broached 'liaison' might be identified 
here. First, the attempts of standing committees to look at the vexed issue of  the so-called 
'Yellow Cake' saga, that is Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium ore from Niger. Second, the 
work of special commissions of inquiry, often led by judicial figures, illustrated here by 
Canada's O'Connell inquiry into the Mahar Arar case. Third, the efforts of the judiciary to 
look at renditions, here illustrated by the efforts of the Milanese courts to probe the case of 
the rendition of Abu Omar.  
 The 'Yellow Cake' saga presents a useful example of multi-national intelligence co-
operation since it has been examined by national committees in the United States, the UK 
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and Italy. All these committees worked in isolation and proved relatively ineffective. The 
saga began on 24 September 2002, when Prime Minister Tony Blair released a dossier on 
Iraqi WMD. Much of the dossier's information was not new to proliferation specialists. One 
of the few pieces of fresh intelligence contained in the dossier was the assertion that Iraq had 
been discovered attempting to buy raw uranium 'yellow cake' from the African state of 
Niger.36 On 19 December 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the 
UN with George Tenet sitting at his right hand to explain why he considered that Iraq had 
failed its recent weapons declaration. One of the points underlined by Powell was Baghdad's 
failure to account for its efforts to buy yellow cake in Africa. A month later, in January 
2003, President Bush thought this matter important enough to include in his State of the 
Union Address. However, on 7 March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Dr Mohamed El Baradei, reported to the UN that much of the 
documentation presented as evidence of Iraqi efforts to buy this material were forgeries, 
indeed embarrassingly weak forgeries. Some documents were written on notepaper from a 
Nigerian military government which had not been in power since the 1980s.37   
 At this point, the national mechanisms of intelligence accountability in several 
countries began to take an interest. Their first task was to identify the source of the forged 
material. Both the UK's ISC and the US Senate Committee on Intelligence sought to clarify 
where this material had come from. However, liaison proved to be a subject that dare not 
speak its name. The Senate committee alluded vaguely to various reports from several 
European agencies. Some suggested that Iraq had also sought to buy from Somalia or the 
Congo. A year later, the Butler Enquiry touched on this matter, again without naming 
countries or giving specifics. The UK insisted that it had not based its assessment of the 
Africa allegation on any forged documents. However, Butler had been persuaded to avoid 
any reference to Britain's largest and most expensive intelligence agency and so did not 
refer directly to previously intercepted GCHQ material suggesting other meetings 
between Nigerian and Iraqi officials between 1997 and 1999.38
 No national enquiry mechanism, standing or otherwise, quite got to the bottom of 
the 'Yellow Cake' saga. Instead, it was journalists who unravelled some of the more 
complex international conduits through which this material had reached the White House. 
Press reports revealed that the French had recruited a former Italian intelligence officer, 
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Rocco Martino, who is alleged to have supplied the forgeries. The UK had received 
material from the French and the UK has passed this to the USA without identifying its 
source, together with other material from GCHQ. However, only in October 2005 did we 
learn why the Yellow Cake issue had been given so much profile by President Bush. It is 
likely that the dubious Italian material had also been hawked by the Italians themselves. 
The Italian Newspaper La Repubblica revealed that Rocco Martino's material was 
identified by both the CIA in Rome and also Italian intelligence personnel as probable 
forgeries. Nevertheless, it is alleged that Nicolò Pollari, Director of SISMI (Italian 
Intelligence), passed copies to the White House after consulting with the Italian Prime 
Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. The press reports of meetings between the Italians and the 
NSC are especially fascinating and represent a classic case of what might be termed 
'international stove-piping'.39
 A month later, on 4 November 2005, in the wake of the Italian press revelations, 
Nicolò Pollari was asked to explain himself to a closed meeting of the Italian 
parliamentary committee on secret services. He conceded that Rocco Martino was 'a 
former intelligence agency informer who had committed the forgeries'. He also admitted 
that Martino was working for the French intelligence service, not SISMI. However, 
Pollari was highly evasive with the Italian committee about contacts between SISMI and 
the NSC in Washington. Nor would he comment on the circulation of this material by 
London and Paris.40 Indeed, the lesson of the 'Yellow Cake' saga is that national 
committees failed to extract much of the story about the complex circulation of this 
material between the four countries involved. Not only was international co-operation 
between investigative journalists more effective, but also the weak national committees 
often failed to get their national agencies to discuss behind closed doors what was already 
in the press. Officials simply blanked their national accountability committees on the 
matter of liaison.41  
 Special commissions, often headed by judicial figures and normally set up to 
examine specific abuses, have traditionally enjoyed more power. Yet they have faired little 
better in the realm of liaison. This is illustrated by the efforts of the Canadian Commission 
of Inquiry under Justice Dennis O'Connor, set up to examine the case of  Maher Arar, a 
Canadian citizen born in Syria. On 26 September 2002, after travelling from Zurich to John 
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F. Kennedy Airport in New York, Maher Arar passed through US immigration. Arar, a 
wireless computer consultant, was en route to Montreal after a family holiday in Tunisia. 
FBI officers and police took him to the Metropolitan Detention Center. He was then sent to 
the Middle East instead of going home to Canada. Arar was taken by a small aircraft to 
Washington DC and then to Jordan. There, Jordan's security forces took him by road to 
Syria. Here he was held in a tiny grave-like cell, from which he was taken periodically to be 
tortured with electrical cables and interrogated. The Canadian government finally secured 
his release in October 2003.42
 In September 2006, four years after Arar's abduction, the O'Connor Commission 
reported. Arar was cleared of any activities that might threaten Canada and awarded over ten 
million dollars compensation.  However, despite its best efforts, the Commission uncovered 
little about the connections between the security organisms in Canada, the USA, Jordan and 
Syria. The United States repeatedly refused to assist the inquiry.  The US ambassador in 
Ottawa at the time of the incident, Paul Cellucci, refused to testify. In common with so 
many of these examples, the inquiry secured resignations but limited information. Although 
the RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli was required to resign because of his 
contradictory evidence to the Canadian House of Commons Committee on Public Safety 
and National Security, both Canadian and American agencies were coy about the nature of 
their co-operation with each other and with Jordan and Syria. Only late in the day did they 
learn that Canadian security officials had, in fact, visited Syria.  
 Significantly, co-operation between the American and Canadian oversight 
mechanisms was also poor.  US Senator Patrick Leahy, who is chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had initially suggested parallel hearings into the Arar case in 
Washington, but took no action. Publicly, Leahy had stated that the US's removal of Arar to 
Syria was instrumental in his abuse. Instead of detaining Arar and sending him a 'couple of 
hundred miles to Canada', instead he was sent on a bizarre journey to Jordan and then Syria.  
He added 'We also knew damn well, if he went to Syria, he'd be tortured.' However, what 
was clearly needed was parallel enquiries in Washington and Ottawa that could compare 
notes. Liaison between the gamekeepers - unlike the poachers - is not permitted, but a 
parallel inquiry would have been permissible and would have fulfilled many of the same 
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functions. Canada had certainly desired a parallel American enquiry, but aside from 
individual pressure from Leahy, little happened.43  
 In Canada, Justice O'Connor was eventually given information on the liaison 
issue, but only on condition that this was excluded from his report. It transpires that 
Canadian security service (CSIS) officers flew to Damascus in November 2002 on a visit 
to improve liaison and concluded a general agreement on intelligence sharing. While they 
were there, they said they had no particular interest in Arar, but this appears to have been 
misread by Damascus.  Some members of the O'Connor commission believe that Syria 
was waiting for permission from Washington before they would release him.  Meanwhile, 
O'Connor was warned that public discussion of these matters would damage US-
Canadian intelligence relations and might even put Canada in 'an intelligence bubble'.44  
 Oversight and accountability is traditionally associated with either the standing 
committees of democratic institutions, commissioners or ad hoc committees of inquiry 
that often enjoy judicial powers. Although their role often has a lower profile, courts also 
have a part to play. The most notable recent examples in the context of liaison have been 
court cases relating to rendition in Germany and Italy. Milanese courts are pressing for 
the extradition of 26 Americans, mostly alleged to be CIA officers, involved in the 
seizure of Abu Omar.  The Berlusconi and Prodi administration refused to co-operate 
with the Milanese courts. None of the CIA officers sought by the Italian courts were in 
Italy when their trial opened in June 2007. However, this has raised the possibility of CIA 
officers being convicted in absentia and then being subject to arrest warrants that are 
enforceable across Europe.45  
 The Milan case focuses on the CIA kidnapping of an Egyptian named Hassan 
Mustafa Osama Nasr, but more commonly known as Abu Omar, on 17 February 2003. 
Abu Omar was a local resident of Milan and also a member of the radical Islamic group 
Jamaat al Islamiya, that is prevalent in Southeast Asia, therefore he was already under 
surveillance by the Italians. His kidnappers reportedly stopped him the street a mile from 
his house, sprayed him with chemicals and then pushed him into an anonymous white  
van. He was then driven to an American airbase in Italy and flown to Ramstein airbase in 
Germany. Here he was transferred to a Gulfstream executive jet and transported to Egypt 
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where he was tortured. Released and then re-arrested, he only secured his freedom in 
February 2007. 
As a result of these events, the first criminal trial relating to CIA extraordinary 
renditions was held in Milan. Some twenty-six Americans and five Italians were charged 
with kidnapping Abu Omar.  The dogged persistence of Milan authorities has ensured 
that the Omar case is one of the best-documented cases of rendition and certainly the 
most high-profile judicial investigation of liaison. An interesting feature has been the way 
in which various courts around Europe examining rendition appear to have achieved 
better co-operation in their investigations than the national accountability committees, 
reflecting the fact that they are not bound by national secrecy requirements. Typically, in 
February 2007, the Swiss government agreed to a prosecutor's plans to investigate the 
flight that appears to have transported Omar through Swiss air space on his way from 
Italy to Germany. The Italian courts have also worked with German a court in Munich, 
which has issued arrest warrants for more than a dozen people who are accused of 
helping with the alleged removal of a German citizen by the CIA. 
 This judicial co-operation reflects that fact that in both Milan and Munich, there is 
a strong sense of an independent judiciary pitted against the executive, and indeed 
perhaps also of region against centre. The Milanese prosecutor, Armando Spataro, has 
been especially pugnacious. Remarkably, in Rome, the Italian constitutional court has 
been asked to examine whether Milanese prosecutors had themselves infringed 
surveillance guidelines when they decided to listen in to telephone conversations made by 
Italian intelligence officers in pursuit of their quarry. It now transpires that the Italian 
intelligence services have also been monitoring the communications of journalists and 
lawyers investigating the Abu Omar case.46  
 Premier Berlusconi made his views on the case known at an early stage. He 
immediately seized on the liaison issue, asserting that this 'is a trial we absolutely should 
not have'. His reasoning for this was that the outcome was likely to be 'that our 
intelligence services will not longer have the co-operation of foreign intelligence'. This 
was a time-honoured executive response to judicial efforts to enquire into liaison. The 
somewhat implausible assertion is often that the foreign intelligence partner is robust 
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enough to constitute an important contributor to national security, but far too flimsy to 
withstand exposure to accountability or oversight.47
 Other commentators have argued that the CIA operation in Italy needs to be 
investigated because it was not only illegal, but detrimental to ongoing intelligence 
operations. Omar was allegedly a key figure in European terrorist networks. Italian 
intelligence was monitoring him through telephone taps and ambient listening devices. 
As a result, Omar was an unwitting fountain of intelligence, but this source was switched 
off when he was abducted in February 2003. His abduction therefore illuminates a 
tension amongst western intelligence and security officials between the objective of 
degrading terrorist core structures and the objective of keeping individuals in play as a 
source of intelligence. The former strategy seems to have driven rendition. Subsequently, 
some Italian officials have complained that intelligence sharing with Washington was a 
one-way street. Moreover in the case of Omar, they have claimed that Washington passed 
misleading information to the Italian police after the kidnap. They suggested that Omar, 
who is thought to have fought in Afghanistan in the past, had probably gone overseas to 
join a jihadist struggle. The result has been a corrosion of trust between Rome and 
Washington.48
 One of the interesting features of the Omar case for students of accountability is the 
conflicting nature of the national accounts that emerge in the press. Italian officials, reported 
in the Italian press, initially insisted that they were not told of the operation. In Washington, 
CIA officers advised the American press that the CIA station chief in Rome sought and 
secured approval from his counterpart in Italy, presumably a senior SISMI officer. 
Apparently, both the CIA and SISMI agreed that if the operation were uncovered they 
would both deny involvement. It now appears that although the Milan operation was 
initially developed by the Rome CIA station chief, it was approved by the CIA's 
Counterterrorism Center, the DCI and eventually taken to one person at the National 
Security Council. Approval was also given by the Italians, albeit this knowledge was tightly 
held. 
Most importantly, the Omar case also underlines the difficulties of studying liaison. 
On the one hand, the Abu Omar case is fascinating because we have so much detail, but on 
the other hand it may be atypical in many respects. With most renditions the local security 
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service seems to have apprehended the target and then transferred him to the CIA, often at a 
nearby airport. In the Omar case, a large paramilitary team from the CIA's Special Activities 
Division (SAD) were despatched and used to abduct him. Exactly why this vast circus felt 
the need to visit Milan remains unclear. Moreover, as the documents generated by the 
Milanese authorities reveal, SAD's operational security was far from good. Some of the 
Americans were identified retrospectively because they could not bear to lose air miles 
and so made use of their frequent flier cards that bore their real names.49 Individuals 
named by the court include the former Milan CIA station chief, Robert Seldon Lady, and 
former Rome CIA station chief, Jeffrey Castelli. An Italian police officer who has 
admitted that he helped to stop Omar in the street in order to facilitate the kidnapping has 
already been sentenced. Indeed, he is perhaps the first European official to be sentenced 
in a case arising out of a liaison operation.50  
 
 
 
4. Regional Enquiries 
At the European level, intelligence inquiries into the subject of extraordinary renditions 
have achieved a first. Tangentially, at least, the CIA offered a response. In March 2007, 
the CIA Director, Michael V. Hayden, took the unusual step of speaking to a group of 
senior European ambassadors on the subject. Although the venue was an informal one, a 
luncheon at the German Embassy in Washington, Hayden explained that his decision to 
speak to them was partly driven by the inaccurate information that was circulating, and 
partly by the strong criticism emanating from the European institutions. This included the 
Council of Europe and the European Parliament. Only a few weeks later, members of a 
team from the European Parliament arrived in Washington to testify about their inquiry 
into renditions on Capitol Hill.51
 Although Hayden was responding to multiple European inquiries, he was not on 
the defensive. He was vocal in his complaints about the hypocrisy of European diplomats 
who had publicly attacked the American programme of renditions and interrogations, 
while at the same time benefiting from the resulting intelligence. Hayden also insisted 
that the scale of the CIA programme, and the sort of treatment that had been dealt out to 
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detainees, had been exaggerated. He insisted that it had involved less than a hundred 
people, not the thousands that were often reported. Moreover, he added that only half had 
been subjected to 'alternative procedures'. Hayden also expressed a wish to separate out 
the CIA programme from parallel activities by the Department of Defense, which 
included the 400 detainees at Guantanamao Bay.52  
 Hayden's underlying worry was the threat to the long-term future of CIA liaison 
activities with a range of key European partners. During the Cold War, the United States 
had been able to ignore turbulence in its intelligence relations with foreign countries. 
However, liaison is now at the core of ongoing CIA operations. The CIA has established 
joint operations centres in more than twenty countries. Here, American and foreign 
intelligence officers 'work side by side to track and capture suspected terrorists and to 
destroy or penetrate their networks'. One of the most important of these centres is thought 
to be located in Paris. This network of centres constitutes the CIA's most successful 
strategy against terrorism, working in an integrated way with foreign security services. In 
2005, the CIA deputy director of operations reportedly told a closed committee sessions 
on Capitol Hill that  'virtually every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq 
since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- more than 3,000 in all -- was a result of foreign 
intelligence services' work alongside the agency.'53 
 In Europe, the regional impetus of accountability has been provided by two linked 
inquiries by the Council of Europe and by the European Parliament. These institutions 
have sought to do three things. To collate existing research on renditions within Europe, 
to clarify Human Rights Law in this context in collaboration with the Venice 
Commission, and to apply pressure to national governments informally through the 
publicity their reports have generated. These European institutions have limited political 
power since they cannot directly call national governments to account. Instead they have 
focused their attention on the strongest area of Europe's surpranationality - its legal 
structure. Having embraced ECHR in the 1990s, European intelligence and security 
services are now beginning to discover its deeper implications. First, many countries 
outside Europe belong to the Council of Europe lending it considerable authority. 
Second, signatories of the ECHR are clearly bound to take due care to ensure its 
provisions are respected within their jurisdictions by the intelligence partners they are 
 20
Global Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability 
working with. As a result, intelligence officers in European have also become more 
cautious in collaborating with the Americans for fear of court action.54  
 The most significant inquiry has been that carried out by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). It is important to underline that this is not a 
component of the European Union, and instead has a wider membership, consisting of 
some forty-six states including Russia. In addition, Canada, Japan, Mexico, the USA 
have observer status. Significantly, most states from Central and Eastern Europe and 
from the former Soviet Union have joined during the last decade. Created in 1945, its  
purpose is to monitor human rights in Europe. Its most significant achievement is the 
European Convention on Human Rights, promulgated in 1950, which led to the  
development of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This court is one of 
the most powerful examples of supranationality and works mainly through generating 
conventions. By drafting conventions, which are in effect international treaties, common 
legal standards are set for member states. These often have effect outside Europe. 
Typically, its Convention on Cybercrime has been signed by Canada, Japan, South Africa 
and the USA and the Lisbon Recognition Convention on university education has been 
signed by Australia, Canada and the USA.  
 On 4 November 2005, the investigative journalist Dana Priest published  
allegations in the New York Times concerning the CIA use of secret prisons in Europe, 
and especially Eastern Europe. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights, called for an investigation into the allegations. Simultaneously, the 
President of the European Parliamentary Assembly, René van der Linden, asked the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, to examine the same issue. He later 
asserted that if secret detention centres existed they would be a clear violation both the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture. Clearly, for the Council, this issue was, in part, a litmus test of their own 
effectiveness in transferring democratic norms and institutions to the new Europe.55  
 The Council of Europe actually initiated two separate inquiries. The Secretary 
General of the Council, Terry Davis, developed an investigation under Article 57 of the 
ECHR, which gave him the authority to demand from member states details of how they 
were ensuring full compliance with the ECHR. Meanwhile, the Committee on Legal 
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Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(hereafter PACE) designated a rapporteur to look into the role of European governments 
in rendition. By early 2006 they had selected Dick Marty, a German lawyer. Marty's 
initial mode of enquiry was deceptively simple. He wrote to all European national 
governments asking them basic questions that ranged from the national regulation of 
foreign intelligence agents on their soil to their procedures for monitoring flights. The 
partial and inadequate nature of the responses from member governments illuminated the 
mismatch between national regulation and international intelligence activity.56
 Marty's PACE inquiry gleaned few precise details about how foreign intelligence 
services were controlled in member states. In general, his impression was that foreign 
agents were not allowed to undertake detentions, but could gather intelligence and recruit 
agents with the permission of national secret services. In other words, national entities, 
normally the domestic security service, authorised requests by foreign services. The 
Czech Republic and the Netherlands had 'special provisions' regulating co-operation 
between their domestic security services and foreign intelligence organisations, but this 
was atypical. In their replies, countries made much of the existence of their parliamentary 
oversight committees, often newly established. However, the Council observed tellingly 
that, where it exists, 'oversight appears to be restricted to the activities of national secret 
services.' The Council concluded that while stronger supervision over the activities of 
national secret services was generally required, 'this is even more the case in respect of 
foreign secret services'.57  
 The Council of Europe also took a keen interest in the rule of law at a national 
level. Typically it censored the Italian justice minister for not forwarding the requests of 
the Milanese judicial authorities for the extradition of CIA officers from the United 
States.58 The issues here are complex and are not only about regional intelligence 
oversight, but also about a judge operating at a regional level complaining about the 
decision of the executive in several countries ignoring the decisions of their courts. 
Although the reports issued by the Council have attracted the most attention, the parallel 
legal processes have been no less significant. One of its earliest initiatives was to ask the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (known as the Venice Commission) 
to develop a legal opinion on the legality of secret detention and other intelligence 
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activities. This took into account the international obligations of member states, in 
particular the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention for 
the Prevention of Torture.59 Some American legal experts have interpreted this as an 
attempt to globalise ECHR and even to impute it to the United States in locations where it 
is co-operating with European partners. However, this seems to be an ambitious 
interpretation.60 In reality, the views of the Venice Commission are unlikely to carry 
weight beyond Europe territorial jurisdictions.61
 The work of the Council of Europe (PACE) also triggered parallel activity by the 
European Parliament.  On 16 January 2006, the European Parliament confirmed its decision 
of the previous month to set up a 'Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European 
countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners' (hereafter TDIP). 
This was designed to accompany the Council of Europe enquiry because some member 
states seemed to have participated in renditions. The remit of this inquiry was thus 
somewhat different, being partly focused on controlling foreign intelligence agencies and 
partly about complicity by Europeans. Its modus operandi was also different to PACE in 
that it tended to work through open sessions rather than taking evidence in private. Its 
legal footprint was also broader, inquiring into violations of the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the EU-
US treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, alongside the obvious provisions 
of ECHR.62
 The TDIP inquiry was led by Claudio Fava, with Baroness Sarah Ludford as 
deputy, presiding over a committee of some forty-four further members of the European 
Parliament. Unlike the Council of Europe, which generated fresh evidence, it tended to 
'piggyback' on the work of other bodies. In reality, its 'research' was more a process of 
collating evidence from a range of national inquires, from court cases, from NGOs and 
human rights organisations, especially by representatives of Amnesty International and 
Human Right Watch. Most important perhaps was evidence from investigative reporters.  
As we have already seen, it was revelations in the American press in November 2005 that 
triggered these regional investigations.  The testimony of specialist journalists working in 
the intelligence field was also important in providing context since the inquiry itself was 
temporary in nature and had little in-house expertise in the field of intelligence.63
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 Where TDIP undertook its own research there were problems. It's estimate of the 
flights operated by the CIA in Europe in fact captured activities that related to more than 
one American agency. TDIP boasted of its ability to penetrate air operations run from 
behind 'a surprisingly thin cover of rural hideaways, front companies and shell 
corporations'.  Most of the details were secured by comparing European and American 
flight control data. TDIP concluded that since September 2001, CIA aircraft had made 
some 1245 stopovers in Europe. This in turn led them to deduce a high overall number of 
secret detainees. It was these speculative conclusions that seem to have prompted a 
reaction from DCI Hayden who was clearly alarmed that the press had begun to conclude 
that all this added up to perhaps a thousand secret prisoners circulating around Europe in 
the hands of the CIA.64  
 In fairness, to TDIP, developing a more detailed narrative of rendition was not a 
primary objective. Instead it perceived itself as a mechanism that took evidence collected 
by others, tested it against key European statues and conventions, and then provided a 
platform basis for action by the European parliament. Unsurprisingly, the TDIP report 
was strident in its criticism of the United States. It concluded that 'in a number of cases, 
the CIA or other US services have been directly responsible for the illegal seizure, 
removal, abduction and detention of terrorist suspects on the territory of Member States'. 
The TDIP also found 'implausible' that certain European governments were not aware of 
extraordinary rendition activity in their countries. It found it 'utterly implausible' that the 
many hundreds of flights had moved through the airspace of European states and airports 
without the knowledge of senior members of the local intelligence and the security 
services. Indeed it observed, with commendable logic, that the insistence of senior US 
policy-makers that they had not encroached on the national sovereignty of European 
countries seemed to confirm local complicity. TDIP became increasingly familiar with 
the long-standing conveniences of liaison since when a 'flap' develops, it allows the host 
government to blame its guests and vice versa, with neither being properly called to 
account.  
 The TDIP inquiry was unique in other respects. It joined with the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, in calling for member states to reject the 
diplomatic assurances against torture as wholly unreliable. Some European states, 
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including the UK have placed much emphasis upon these. More importantly, it expressly 
addressed liaison. It gave full recognition to the importance of close co-operation 
between the intelligence services of the member states and their allies, but thought that 
this had been 'conducted' with the abandonment of sovereignty over European territory. It 
called for more effective controls over the activities of foreign secret services in Europe 
and suggesting that the rules of intelligence co-operation should be established at EU 
level. It also suggested the need for internal EU monitoring of 'new rules on the exchange 
of information between intelligence services'.65  
 The TDIP visited member states and also undertook two overseas 'missions', one 
to Macedonia and the other to the USA.66  The visit to Washington in May 2006 included 
meetings with the State Department and members of Congress, such as Arlen Specter, the 
Republican chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. A meeting of 
minds was never likely but it allowed the TDIP to hear at first hand the views of  John 
Bellinger, the State Department's Chief Legal Adviser. Predictably perhaps, Bellinger 
argued that, partly on grounds of self-defence, the US government enjoyed a degree of 
'freedom of action' in combating Al Qaeda, over and above the international conventions 
it might have acceded to in the past.67
 The TDIP interim report underpinned a highly critical resolution, adopted by the 
European Parliament on 6 July 2006, on the alleged use of European countries by the 
CIA for the illegal detention of prisoners.68 The TDIP produced a final report on 23 
January 2007, leading to a further critical resolution in the European parliament on 14 
February 2007.  The final report was adopted by a significant majority, with 382 MEPs 
voting in favour, 256 against and 74 abstaining.69 In April 2007, Jonathan Evans led a 
European Parliament delegation to Washington to defend the criticisms. They gave 
testimony to the House panel on Human Rights. Capitol Hill was divided in its reception 
of this further delegation, with some arguing that rendition had been a useful tool under 
Clinton administration, but had been abused under Bush. Others were outraged by the 
efforts of Italian courts to effect the extradition of CIA officers for doing their duty.70
 The European enquiries also underline a symbiotic relationship with the press. Both 
inquiries were triggered by specific press stories in late 2005 by American investigative 
journalists. Research by the Washington Post and ABC news in 2005 were central to the 
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unravelling of the secret prisons story. Prior to the enquiries by the Council of Europe and 
the European Parliament there was remarkably little general press interest in Europe. The 
reports and debates in Europe in 2006 and 2007 have generated much of the subsequent 
press attention. As Marty himself observed:  
 
We may well ask why it is only now that the allegations concerning secret detention 
centres in Europe are triggering a proper debate and public shock and indignation at 
the reports of ill-treatment and even torture in this connection. In countries that pride 
themselves in being long-standing democracies that protect human rights, the 
revelation of these allegations should have sparked off reactions and categorical 
condemnation several months ago, and yet this was not the case… 
 
One might argue that in political terms, all the European committees and reports been 
able to do is act as a glorified transmission belt, ultimately generating more press stories 
and in some cases triggering national inquiries, such as the UK report on renditions in 
2007. In political terms at least, it is only by these indirect means that pressure has been 
placed upon national governments.71  
  
 
 
5. International Enquiry: The UNIIIC 
Perhaps most surprising development has been the appearance of what is in effect an 
investigation into intelligence co-operation at the international level. This is most unusual 
because international organisations and non-governmental organisations have enjoyed a 
traditional aversion to intelligence matters in general.  Since 1989 we have seen a gradual 
change. The growing level of both UN and regional intervention to deal with civil wars, 
proliferation, state failure and warlordism after the end of the Cold War has ensured that the 
UN, at second hand at least, was tackling opponents that were elusive and arguably required 
some intelligence capabilities to address them. Important failures, such as Rwanda in 1990, 
are in retrospect effectively regarded as UN 'intelligence failures'.  In the former Yugoslavia, 
where organised crime, paramilitaries and intelligence services over-lapped to a 
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considerable degree, the UN had no choice but to take more account of them. Complex 
peacekeeping operations underlined a need for intelligence support on the ground and also 
for political operations at a higher level. Moreover, there is an increasing acceptance that 
security sector reform must include the intelligence and security service.72
 A key motor for change was the creation by the UN of the International Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. This is more 
commonly referred to as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or 
ICTY.  ICTY in The Hague confronted UN officials with the uncomfortable fact that it 
would actually have something that was close to their own intelligence organisation by any 
other name. The Office of Investigation of this tribunal has been staffed by a multinational 
team of defence and police intelligence officers. Their targets are often themselves former 
intelligence personnel from the Balkans.  Once identified, the operations to arrest them have 
also required co-operation between of Office of Investigation at ICTY and the intelligence 
and special forces of SFOR and NATO. Many of the former intelligence officers have now 
set themselves up in organised crime in Balkans. The United Nations monitoring mission in 
Iraq in the 1990s also entailed complex and not untroubled engagement with intelligence.73
 However, 2005 witnessed a new departure in terms of the United Nations, namely 
an international intelligence inquiry into an assassination. On 14 February 2005 the Prime 
Minster of the Lebanon, Rafik Hariri was killed, along with 21 people, by a massive 
bomb. An IED that was equivalent to approximately 1,500 lb. of TNT was detonated as 
his official motorcade passed near St. George Hotel in central Beirut. The explosion was 
devastating and also killed several bodyguards and the former Minister of the Economy, 
Bassel Fleihan. Hariri’s car was travelling in a convoy of six other vehicles and was 
equipped with the most advanced protection against remotely detonated  IEDs. However, 
the use of a suicide bomber defeated many of these protective devices and the assassin 
managed to reach his target. Form the outset, many observers suspected collusion 
between the intelligence services of Syria, the Lebanon and various local proxies.74
 Hariri's world standing was considerable. Hariri was well regarded among 
international leaders and enjoyed substantive support from London and Washington. He 
was also a close friend of the French President, Jacques Chirac. Immediately after the 
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bombing, Kofi Annan despatched a fact-finding team to Lebanon resulting in the 
Fitzgerald Report. On 7 April 2005, the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1595 which established the United Nations International Independent 
Inquiry Commission (UNIIIC) to investigate the murder. This was led by a German 
prosecutor, Detlev Mehlis. The inquiry was clearly part of a wider political effort to roll 
back Syrian influence and Lebanese demonstrations together with international pressure, 
forced the Syrian government to remove its covert intelligence and overt military 
apparatus from Lebanon. 
 During the first twelve weeks of the inquiry, some three hundred and eighty 
people were questioned and 60,000 documents were examined. At an early stage, several 
leading suspects were identified. A number of people were arrested and charged with 
conspiracy to commit murder and related crimes in connection with the assassination of 
Hariri and twenty-two others. On 20 October 2005, the UNIIIC's initial report asserted 
that both Lebanese and Syrian intelligence officials had been involved in the 
assassination of Hariri. It gave special attention to Syria's military intelligence chief, 
Assef Shawkat and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's brother-in-law. Responding to a 
request from the Lebanese Government, Kofi Annan extended the mandate of the UNIIIC 
to the end of the year. On 13 December 2005, Detlev Mehlis, reported that the Syrians 
had procrastinated and obstructed the investigation. However, they eventually offered up 
five Syrian officials who were under suspicion. These officials were interviewed in 
Vienna. This allowed them to offer more detail supporting their earlier assertions that 
members of Lebanese and Syrian intelligence and security services had been involved in 
the assassination. 
 Hariri was a leading member of the anti-Syrian opposition which was seeking to 
block efforts to extend the term of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who was perceived 
as a Syrian puppet. Hariri reportedly received physical threats to induce him to support 
Lahoud. On 30 December 2005, former Syrian vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam in a 
televised interview implicated President Assad in the assassination and said that Assad 
personally threatened Hariri in the months before his death. On the ground, the UN 
investigators were themselves subjected to attack and several key members of the team 
have narrowly escaped death from grenade attacks and roadside bombs. This included Lt 
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Colonel Samir Shadade, Chief of the Lebanese interior ministry’s intelligence branch. 
Lebanese politicians have asked to extend the investigative team's duration and charter, to 
include assassinations  
 Damascus clearly hoped that December 2005 would see the end of the UNIIIC 
investigation. However, in January 2006 a new commissioner was appointed, Serge 
Brammertz. The UN's dogged persistence paid off. During March 2006 it was able to 
report growing Syrian co-operation with its investigators. In the light of this the UN 
Security Council approved preparations for a Joint International and Lebanese Tribunal 
to review the evidence. In late April 2006, President Assad of Syria held meetings with 
Brammertz, allowing the UN and Lebanon to sign an agreement of the creation of a 
special tribunal on 6 February 2007. Remarkably, Serge Brammertz's reports in 2006  
praised Syria for its co-operation. In December 2007 the Netherlands agreed to host the 
tribunal in the town of Leidschendam, a suburb of The Hague. The tribunal is housed in 
the former headquarters of the Netherlands General Intelligence Agency.75
 The UNIIIC enquiry has not secured all its objectives and is likely only to identify 
the small players in the assassination of Hariri.  Nevertheless, it is important several reasons. 
First, it reflects a long-term change in the attitude of the United Nations towards 
intelligence. Intelligence agencies are mainstream - even omnipresent in a globalising world 
- and the United Nations has little choice but to accept their importance and on occasion to 
review their activities. Moreover, there is recognition of the neutral quality of intelligence 
agencies, an instrument that can be used for both malign and benign purposes. Fore 
example, few can ignore the progressive role of intelligence services as covert negotiators 
trying to promote peace between factions in Northern Ireland and the Middle East since 
1989. The United Nations is beginning to recognise that good governance and 
modernisation also extends to intelligence and security services. The emphasise that the UN 
counter-terrorism committee has placed on security sector reform also underlines this. 
Inescapably, good governance in the realm of intelligence also extends to accountability and 
oversight.76  
 
 
 
 29
Global Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability 
Conclusion 
History suggests that intelligence and security agencies, and indeed the policy-makers 
whom they serve, are unlikely to be in a rush to address the substantial lacuna that liaison 
presents to oversight and accountability. In recent times, it has largely been European 
enquiries that have taken issue with liaison, causing official consternation in Washington. 
Three decades ago, the boot was on the other foot. During the late 1970s, as the United 
States embarked on its 'Season of Inquiry' and developed a remarkable new system of 
congressional oversight committees focused on intelligence, damage to liaison with 
major overseas services the was the primary concern for American intelligence officials. 
In the UK, SIS and GCHQ were especially anxious that information about joint 
operations might emerge. In 1979, DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner testified to Congress 
that a direct result of these hearings had been a subsequent reluctance on the part of 
foreign agencies to share intelligence or to plan for joint covert action with the United 
States. He explained:  
 
We have had more sources tell us they are very nervous about continuing work with 
us. We have had very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence 
services with whom we conduct liaison, who have questioned whether they should 
continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I cannot 
estimate to you how many potential sources of liaison arrangements have never 
germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us. 
 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that intelligence liaison and accountability have never 
mixed well. During the 1990s, American officials left both British and Canadian officials 
in no doubt that enthusiastic co-operation with accountability bodies would result in a 
curtailment of the flow of intelligence.77
 Although this has been a long-standing issue, the acceleration of intelligence 
liaison over the last decade has brought about a qualitative change in the nature of 
intelligence. Improved international intelligence co-operation has changed the way in 
which agencies work. Accordingly, the 'black hole' presented by liaison is now too big to 
ignore, a veritable elephant in the corner of the room.  Some of the more imaginative 
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accountability committees have begun to give this subject serious thought, but the 
answers are not immediately clear.78 National committees seem inappropriate, given that 
their work-a-day effectiveness depends on continually demonstrating that they are worthy 
of trust in the context of their own national services. They are not naturally inclined to 
adventurous activity. Reflecting on the experience PACE, Dick Marty has suggested that 
complex intelligence cases that transcend borders raise the issue of whether current 
instruments are still equal to the task. He has called for a new type of regional committee, 
assisted by experts enjoying more extensive investigatory powers. This he views as 
essential to deal with these new important challenges.79
 What is clear is that the regulatory legacy of a brief period of post-Cold War 
optimism will not go away. In the mid-1990s, ECHR was written into the statutes that 
conferred a legal identity on many of Europe's services. The legal ramifications of ECHR 
ensure that, within European jurisdictions at least, wherever European intelligence 
services are partners of overseas services, there will be increasing scrutiny. Arguably, 
intelligence services would be wise to engage with these first glimmerings of global 
governance, rather than hide from it. The broad experience of democracies with 
accountability committees over the last thirty years have not been as ghastly as some 
once predicted. At a regional level, a similar process of institutional education of officials 
and elected representatives will be required, but there is no reason why this should not 
also be successful and result in mutual understanding.  
Intelligence services under pressure from globalization have an important story to 
tell. Over the last decade intelligence services have been more the victims than the 
villains of the peace. Placed in the front line, not only against terrorism, but also 
organised crime, warlordism and other globalized threats, they have been asked to do 
many unpleasant things. Intelligence is no longer the passive world of Cold War bean-
counting, but a world that requires disruption and enforcement against immediate threats. 
Yet at the same time, while they have been cast in the unwelcome role of the 'toilet 
cleaners of globalization', intelligence services are themselves under growing surveillance 
from global civil society. Intelligence services cannot, at one and the same time, be tough 
enough to deal with some of the more intractable transnational problems of the world and 
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soft enough to please the human rights lawyers. The rendition saga illustrates this rather 
well.  
International and regional accountability for intelligence liaison will emerge only 
slowly. Even if we were to see the creation of effective supranational or transnational 
bodies that might conduct oversight and accountability in the area of intelligence, like so 
much global governance they will suffer from an obvious democratic deficit. The arrival 
of unaccountable accountability bodies in this area would not necessarily be a welcome 
step. International lawyers are externally hopefully about the possibility of these sorts of 
bodies but the reluctance of major powers to co-operate with them suggests that inquiries 
like UNIIIC will be the exception rather than the rule.80 Global governance remains 
weak, meanwhile we can expect global civil society, including journalists and human 
rights watchers to play a growing role in informal oversight and accountability.81  
Informal oversight might be said to included a free press, independent think tanks 
and lobby groups, and, in the case of new democracies, foreign-funded non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that are increasingly expected to monitor and help to reform 
intelligence organizations. The significant contribution of NGOs, especially in new 
democracies such as Argentina, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Romania, to name only a few 
countries, is continuous pressure on the executive to pursue intelligence reform. This sort 
of oversight is less constrained by national boundaries. However, it is also problematic, 
since these organisations have no democratic mandate and are not concerned with 
effectiveness. For accountability to be embraced by practitioners, the intelligence services 
must believe that it makes them more effective. In short, informal oversight is effective at 
blowing the whistle on spectacular abuse or scandal, but it is difficult to see how it might 
be institutionalised to provide oversight over routine matters, still less develop patterns of 
trust. 
 What might nation states themselves do to extend national accountability to 
encompass intelligence liaison? The likelihood of committees of politicians being 
allowed to peer into this sensitive area remains low.82 However, a little explored 
alternative would be Inspectors General with extended authority to operate in more than 
one country. If states co-operating on intelligence can agree on complex protocols for the 
distribution of sensitive material, they can agree on common guidelines for investigating 
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officers.  Inspectors General have obvious short-comings in the sense that their inquiries 
are internal. Yet arguably, in the ultra-secret world of intelligence co-operation, this is 
possibly what is required. A senior intelligence official, perhaps the respected former 
head of national service, could serve as a roving Inspector General for a number of allied 
countries working together, perhaps reporting to a body such as NATO. This is certainly 
conceivable in the context of the more prominent US, EU and Commonwealth services.  
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